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Abstract
Collaborative predictive blacklisting (CPB) allows to fore-
cast future attack sources based on logs and alerts contributed
by multiple organizations. Unfortunately, however, research on
CPB has only focused on increasing the number of predicted
attacks but has not considered the impact on false positives
and false negatives. Moreover, sharing alerts is often hindered
by confidentiality, trust, and liability issues, which motivates
the need for privacy-preserving approaches to the problem. In
this paper, we present a measurement study of state-of-the-art
CPB techniques, aiming to shed light on the actual impact of
collaboration. To this end, we reproduce and measure two sys-
tems: a non privacy-friendly one that uses a trusted coordinat-
ing party with access to all alerts [14] and a peer-to-peer one
using privacy-preserving data sharing [9]. We show that, while
collaboration boosts the number of predicted attacks, it also
yields high false positives, ultimately leading to poor accuracy.
This motivates us to present a hybrid approach, using a semi-
trusted central entity, aiming to increase utility from collabo-
ration while, at the same time, limiting information disclosure
and false positives. This leads to a better trade-off of true and
false positive rates, while at the same time addressing privacy
concerns.
1 Introduction
Filtering connections from/to malicious hosts is often used
to reduce network attacks and their impact. Due to the im-
possibility of performing expensive computations in real-time
on each connection, filtering is usually done via simple look-
ups, using periodically updated lists of suspicious hosts, i.e.,
blacklists. These can be created locally and/or by obtaining
the most prolific attack sources from alert repositories such as
DShield.org or DeepSight [1].
In [11], Katti et al. study the prevalence of “correlated” at-
tacks, i.e., mounted by the same sources against different net-
works. They find them to be very common, and highly tar-
geted, suggesting that real-time collaboration between victims
could improve malicious IP detection time. Zhang et al. [16]
are the first to introduce the concept of collaborative predic-
tive blacklisting (CPB): different organizations send their logs
to a central authority that, in turn, provides them with cus-
tomized blacklists based on relevance ranking. In follow-up
work, Soldo et al. [14] improve on [16] by replacing rank-
ing with an implicit recommender system. Overall, collabora-
∗A preliminary version of this paper appears in ACM SIGCOMM’s Com-
puter Communication Review. This is the full version.
tive approaches to threat mitigation are increasingly advocated,
with more and more efforts to promote information sharing,
including those proposed by CERT [4], RedSky Alliance [13],
Facebook’s ThreatExchange [3], or the White House [15].
In this work, we focus on two open problems that re-
main largely unaddressed w.r.t. the impact of collaboration on
(1) false positives/negatives, and (2) privacy. Prior work on
CPB [14, 16] only focuses on measuring “hit counts”, i.e.,
the number of true positives, but fails to account for incor-
rect predictions—i.e., false positive/negatives. Moreover, real-
world deployment of collaborative blacklisting is hindered by
confidentiality issues, as well as trust, liability, and compet-
itiveness concerns as sharing alerts could harm an organiza-
tion’s reputation or disclose sensitive information about cus-
tomers and business practices [2]. To the best of our knowl-
edge, the peer-to-peer model proposed by Freudiger et al. [9]
is the only privacy-friendly approach to the problem: organi-
zations interact in a pairwise manner, aiming to privately es-
timate the benefits of collaboration, and then share data with
“good” partners. However, as discussed later in this paper, it is
not clear how to deploy their decentralized techniques in prac-
tice.
First, we reproduce, measure, and compare the centralized
(non-private) system by Soldo et al. [14] vs the peer-to-peer
privacy-friendly one by Freudiger et al. [9], using alerts ob-
tained from DShield.org, involving 70 organizations which re-
port an average of 4,000 daily events over a 15-day time win-
dow. We finding that the former [14] achieves high hit counts
(almost doubling correct predictions compared to no collab-
oration), but its F1 accuracy is ultimately poor (14%) due to
high false positives. Whereas, the latter [9] allows for better
control over incorrect predictions, thus resulting in a better F1
score overall (29%), but actually only slightly improves the hit
counts over no collaboration since its peer-to-peer approach
limits the amount of data that gets shared.
Our measurements lead to the intuition that, if one needs
to control false positives, a controlled data sharing approach
might kill two birds with one stone: (1) help organizations
find a better trade-off between prediction improvement and
increase in false positives, and (2) do so while actually min-
imizing exposure of possibly confidential data. Therefore, we
introduce and analyze a novel hybrid model, relying on a semi-
trusted authority, or STA, which acts as a coordinating entity
to facilitate clustering without having access to the raw data.
The STA clusters contributors based on the similarity of their
logs (without seeing these logs), and helps organizations in the
same cluster to share relevant data. Toward this goal, we per-
form a set of measurements to shed light on (i) how to cluster
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Contributor ID Source ID Source Port Target Port Timestamp
...D982918 104.217.230.059 6000 1433 2015-06-06 11:49:32
Table 1: Example of an entry in the DShield logs.
organizations, (ii) what should be shared among them, and (iii)
how to measure the effect of collaboration on accuracy.
We experiment with a few clustering algorithms using the
number of common attacks as a measure of similarity, which
can be computed in a privacy-preserving way, and experi-
ment with privacy-friendly within-clusters sharing strategies,
namely, only disclosing the details of common/correlated at-
tacks. Overall, we show that our new hybrid model outper-
forms [9] in terms of hit counts (4x), while achieving better
accuracy than [14] (2x).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Datasets
We gather a dataset of blacklisted IP addresses from
DShield.org, a collaborative firewall log correlation system to
which various organizations volunteer daily alerts. Each entry
in the logs includes a pseudonymized Contributor ID (the tar-
get), source IP address (the attacker), source and target port
number, and a timestamp. An example of an entry log is illus-
trated in Table 1.
With DShield’s permission, we collect logs using a web
crawler, from February to September 2015, gathering, on av-
erage, 10 million logs from 120,000 organizations every day.
We exclude entries for invalid or non-routable IP addresses,
and discard port numbers, then, for each IP address, we extract
its /24 subnet and use /24 addresses for all experiments, fol-
lowing experimental choices made in prior work [9, 14, 16].
This does not necessarily mean that predictive blacklisting al-
gorithms will blacklist entire /24 subnets, since blacklisting an
address does not imply blocking all its traffic, but rather sub-
ject it to further scrutiny, e.g., enforcing rate limiting or only
allowing outgoing packets. Nonetheless, recall that our main
goal here is to compare the impact of different collaboration
approaches on prediction.
We select a 15-day period, May 17–31, 2015 and restrict
our evaluations to a reasonably-sized sample of regularly con-
tributing organizations. We select the top-100 contributors,
based on the number of unique IPs reported, that also report
logs every day during the 15 days and notice that most con-
tributors (around 60) submit less than 100K logs, while fewer
(around 20) submit between 100K and 500K, and only a few
organizations contribute large amounts of logs (above 1M).
Then, we pick 70 organizations, for each time window, leaving
out the top-10 and the bottom-20 contributors. We do so, like
in previous work [9, 14], to minimize bias. More specifically,
the top contributors contribute a huge number of IPs (order of
magnitudes more than other contributors) which might be ir-
relevant to most organizations, whereas, the bottom ones only
report very few logs, thus adding little or nothing to the collab-
oration. Our final sample dataset includes 30 million attacks,
contributed by 118 different organizations over 15 days, each
reporting a daily average of 600 suspicious (unique) IPs and
4,000 attack events. This constitutes our “ground truth”: if an
IP appears in the blacklist for an organization, it is considered
to be malicious for that organization.
We use this dataset both as training and testing sets – more
precisely, we consider a sliding window of 5 days for training
and 1 day for testing, as done in previous work [9, 14].
Note that we have also repeated our experiments on two
more sets of DShield logs, using another 15-day periods (over
Feb-Dec 2015), but have not found any significant difference
in the results.
Notation. We use notation O = {Oi}ni=1 to denote a group of
n organizations, where each Oi holds a dataset Di of alerts,
i.e., suspicious IP addresses along with the related timestamp.
We aim to predict IP addresses generating attacks to each Oi
in the next day, using, as the training set, both its local dataset
Di, as well the set D′i, with suspicious IP addresses obtained
by collaborating with other organizations. As discussed above,
we consider n = 70 organizations using alerts collected from
DShield.
2.2 EWMA Time Series Prediction
We use Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA)
to perform prediction. Given a signal over time r(t), we indi-
cate with r˜(t + 1) the predicted value of r(t + 1), given past
observations r(t′) at time t′ ≤ t. The predicted signal is com-
puted as:
r˜(t+ 1) =
t∑
t′=1
α · (1− α)t−t′ · r(t′) (1)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is a smoothing coefficient, t′ = 1, . . . , t
denotes the training window, and t + 1 is the time slot to be
predicted. For small values of α, EWMA aggregates past in-
formation uniformly across the training window, while, with a
large α, the prediction algorithm focuses more on events taking
place in the recent past.
2.3 Metrics
Throughout our evaluations, we use the following metrics to
evaluate the performance of the predictions.
True and False Positives. For each time window and for each
organization, we count True Positives (TP) as well as False
Positives (FP). A TP occurs when the prediction algorithm in-
cludes an IP address in an organization’s predictive blacklist
that does appear in its testing set, and a FP – when it does not.
False Negatives. For each time window/organization, we gen-
erate predictive whitelists, i.e., sets of IPs that are not likely to
attack an organization the next day, and count a False Nega-
tive (FN) when a whitelisted IP address instead appears in the
testing set.
TP Improvement and FP/FN Increase. We also measure the
average improvement/increase in TP, FP, and FN when com-
pared to a baseline local approach, i.e., when no collabora-
tion occurs between organizations and each of them makes
its predictions based only on its local dataset. The improve-
ment in TP is calculated as: TPimpr = (TPc − TP )/TP
where TPc is the number of true positives after collaboration
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and TP without. Similarly, the increase in FP and FN is de-
noted, resp., as FPincr = (FPc − FP )/FP and FNincr =
(FNc − FN)/FN .
Precision, Recall and F1-Score. We calculate the True Posi-
tive Rate (TPR), aka recall, False Positive Rate (FPR), as well
as Positive Predictive Value (PPV), aka precision, defined as:
TPR=TP/(TP+FN), FPR=FP/(FP + TN), PPV=TP/(TP + FP),
and derive the F1 measure, i.e.,
F1 = 2 · PPV · TPR
PPV + TPR
Remarks on FP: The absence of an IP from our testing set
can occur either when the IP is not considered suspicious or
if it does not generate requests. While we cannot actually dis-
tinguish between the two cases, in the latter a FP is actually
less “severe” than in the former, thus our FP count may be
a bit more conservative. However, our main goal is really to
measure and compare with each other the impact of different
collaboration strategies on predictions so we use this method
without loss of generality.
3 Evaluating CPB Techniques
3.1 Soldo et al. [14]
We first evaluate Soldo et al [14]’s CPB approach based on
implicit recommendation. We do so aiming to: (1) evaluate
false positives and false negatives, which were not taken into
consideration in [14], and (2) compare against privacy-friendly
approaches, presented later. Essentially, Soldo et al.’s work
builds on [16], which bases on a relevance ranking scheme
similar to PageRank, measuring the correlation of an attacker
to a contributor relying on their history as well as the attacker’s
recent log production patterns. Soldo et al. significantly im-
prove on this, by using an implicit recommendation system to
discover similar victims as well as groups of correlated victims
and attackers. The presence of attacks performed by the same
source around the same time leads to stronger victim similarity,
and a neighborhood model (k-NN) is applied to cluster similar
victims. Cross Association (CA) co-clustering [5] is then used
to discover groups of correlated attackers and victims, and pre-
diction within the cluster is done via the EWMA time series
algorithm (TS) to capture attacks’ temporal trends. In other
words, the prediction score for each organization is a weighted
ensemble of three methods (TS, k-NN and CA). We have re-
implemented their system in Python, using Chakrabarti’s CA
implementation [5].
We start by measuring the basic predictor which only relies
on a local EWMA time series algorithm (TS), using α = 0.9
as it yields the best results, then, apply the co-clustering tech-
niques (TS-CA), and, finally, implement their full scheme by
combining k-NN to cluster victims based on their similarity
with CA and TS (TS-CA-k-NN). Fig. 1 illustrates the improve-
ment/increase in TP, FP, FN (compared to the TS baseline) as
well as TPR, PPV, and F1, with various k values (ranging from
1 to 35) used by the k-NN algorithm to discover similar or-
ganizations. Obviously, the k-NN parameter k does not affect
TS-CA and TS.
Fig. 1(a) shows that, with TS-CA-k-NN, TPimpr increases
significantly with k, almost doubling the “hit count” compared
to the TS baseline, whereas, TS-CA improves less (0.67). On
the other hand, however, there is FPincr too, 5- to 50-fold, as
clusters become bigger (Fig. 1(b)), and naturally, this stark in-
crease in FP leads to low precision, as shown in Fig. 1(e). FNs
also always increase compared to TS (Fig. 1(c)), specifically,
they double with TS-CA and increase between 0.55 and 0.99
(less for larger k values) compared to TS. FNincr also affects
TPR (Fig. 1(d)), with an increase between 0.58 and 0.66. The
TPimpr does not correspond to a comparable increase in TPR,
due to the poor FN performance, as shown by the fact that TS-
CA-k-NN reaches 0.99 in TPimpr but only at most 0.66 TPR
compared to 0.59 with the baseline TS. Overall, Soldo et al.’s
techniques achieve poor F1 measures, at most 0.16 and 0.14,
with TS-CA and TS-CA-k-NN, actually lower than a simple
local time-series prediction (0.26).
3.2 Freudiger et al. [9]
Next, we evaluate the privacy-friendly peer-to-peer ap-
proach to CPB by Freudiger et al. [9]. Organizations interact
pairwise, aiming to privately estimate the benefits of collabo-
ration, and then share data with entities that are likely to yield
the most benefits. They also use DShield data and perform
prediction using EWMA. They find that: (1) the number of
common attacks is the best predictor of benefits, which can be
estimated privately, using Private Set Intersection Cardinality
(PSI-CA) [6]; and (2) sharing only the intersection of attacks
– which can be done privately using Private Set Intersection
(PSI) [7] – is almost as beneficial as sharing everything. Their
goal is really to assess benefit estimation/sharing strategies,
rather than to focus on deployment. They assume a network
of 100 organizations, select the “top 50” among all possible
4950 pairs (in terms of estimated benefits), and only experi-
ment on those. Naturally, without a coordinating entity, it is
impossible to rank the pairs, so they suggest that one should
collaborate with either organizations when estimated benefits
are above a threshold, although it is not stated how to set this
threshold; or with the top x organizations with the biggest es-
timated benefits, but do not experiment with or discuss how x
impacts overhead or true/false positives. We replicate both ap-
proaches: (A) with the top 1% to 5% of global pairs, and (B)
having each organization pick 1 to 35 most similar organiza-
tions.
Fig. 2 shows the improvement/increase in TP, FP, FN (com-
pared to a baseline with no sharing) as well as TPR, PPV and
F1 with increasing percentage of global pairs (A). We omit
plots for approach (B) since they are worse across the board,
although we discuss them next. Looking at TPimpr, (A) yields
13% increase when 3% of global pairs are selected whereas for
(B), i.e. picking local pairs, TPimpr increases along with the
number of local pairs selected. (A) has a rather small FPincr
(13% increase when the 75 top pairs are selected) compared
to (B) which is affected by the number of pairs that each or-
ganizations picks for collaboration. When an organization col-
laborates with 5 others a 25% FPincr is observed on average
while when it collaborates with 30 others FPincr reaches 80%.
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Figure 1: Soldo et al. [14]: (a) TP improvement, (b) FP increase (y-axis in log scale), (c) FN increase, (d) TPR, (e) Precision, (f) F1 measure.
Moreover, we find both approaches achieve a decrease in false
negatives with the second approach achieving bigger decreases
as the number of collaborators increases.
Overall, both approaches improve precision and recall of
the system, yielding higher F1 scores compared to a local ap-
proach. Although the increase in TP is not as high as with the
non-private approach of [14], a more balanced increase of false
positives and a decrease of the false negatives seems possible.
However, the system is limited in the amount of new informa-
tion organizations learn (e.g., only events about IPs they have
already seen is shared) as well as scalability, since both the
computation of the metrics and the actual data sharing are con-
ducted pair-wise (if there are n collaborating entities, the com-
plexity of the data sharing would be O(n2)).
4 A Novel Hybrid Approach
Centralized state-of-the-art CPB techniques [14] have only
focused on improving “hit counts,” but, as shown above, they
generate very high false positive rates. In practice, organiza-
tions might not adopt such solutions if they generate a large
number of false alarms. Naturally, one could design better cen-
tralized approaches that yield better accuracy, e.g., by learning
to discard the data that yield false positives. However, our in-
tuition is that in this case a privacy-preserving approach might
be best suited as it can (i) help organizations find a better trade-
off between prediction improvement and increase in false pos-
itives, and (ii) do so while actually minimizing exposure of
possibly confidential data.
Overview. To this end, we introduce a novel hybrid system
which relies on a semi-trusted authority, or STA, acting as a co-
ordinating entity to facilitate clustering without having access
to the raw data. In other words, the STA clusters contributors
based on the similarity of their logs (without accessing these
logs), and helps organizations in the same cluster to share rel-
evant logs.
The system involves four steps. (1) First, organizations in-
teract in a pairwise manner to privately compute a similarity
measure of their logs, based on the number of common attacks
(similar to [9]). Then, (2) the STA collects the similarity mea-
sures from each organization and performs clustering using
one of three possible algorithms, i.e., Agglomerative Cluster-
ing, k-means, or k-NN.1 Next, (3) the STA reports to each orga-
nization the identifiers of other organizations in the same clus-
ter (if any), so that they collaboratively, yet privately, share logs
to boost the accuracy of their prediction, by either sharing com-
mon attacks (intersection), correlated attacks (IP2IP), or both.
For comparison, we also consider baseline approaches, i.e.,
sharing nothing (local) or sharing everything (global). Finally,
(4) each organization performs EWMA prediction (again, with
α = 0.9, as done in our evaluation of [14]). based on their logs,
plus those from entities in the same cluster. This approach is
hybrid in that, while involving a central authority, data sharing
is privacy-friendly: in (1) the number of common attacks can
be computed using PSI-CA [6], while in (3) sharing of com-
mon attacks can occur using PSI [7] and of correlated attacks
using [12].
Settings. We once again use datasets and settings from Sec-
1Note that, to ease presentation, we do not plot results using Agglomerative Clus-
tering because it yields the worse results.
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Figure 2: Freudiger et al. [9] (a) TP improvement, (b) FP increase, (c) FN increase, (d) TPR, (e) Precision and (f) F1, with increasing percentage
of global pairs.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
k-means k
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
A
ve
ra
g
e
 I
m
p
ro
ve
m
e
n
t 
of
 T
ru
e
 P
os
it
iv
e
s 
(T
P)
Global
Intersection
Ip2Ip
Ip2Ip + Intersection
(a)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
k-means k
10-2
10-1
100
101
102
103
A
ve
ra
g
e
 I
n
cr
e
a
se
 o
f 
Fa
ls
e
 P
o
si
ti
ve
s 
(F
P)
 -
 L
o
g
 S
ca
le
Global
Intersection
Ip2Ip
Ip2Ip + Intersection
(b)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
k-means k
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
A
ve
ra
g
e
 I
n
cr
e
a
se
 o
f 
Fa
ls
e
 N
e
g
a
ti
ve
s 
(F
N
)
Global
Intersection
Ip2Ip
Ip2Ip + Intersection
(c)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
k-means k
0.56
0.58
0.60
0.62
0.64
0.66
0.68
0.70
0.72
0.74
T
ru
e
 P
o
si
ti
ve
 R
a
te
 (
T
PR
)
Local
Global
Intersection
Ip2Ip
Ip2Ip + Intersection
(d)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
k-means k
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
Pr
e
ci
si
o
n
 (
PP
V
)
Local
Global
Intersection
Ip2Ip
Ip2Ip + Intersection
(e)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
k-means k
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
F1
 M
e
a
su
re
Local
Global
Intersection
Ip2Ip
Ip2Ip + Intersection
(f)
Figure 3: k-means: (a) TP improvement, (b) FP increase (y-axis in log scale), (c) FN increase, (d) TPR, (e) Precision, (f) F1 measure.
tion 2. Also, for the IP2IP method, we only consider the top-
1000 attackers (i.e., the top-1000 heavy hitters) in each clus-
ter, for each 5-day training-set window, rather than looking for
correlations over all the /24 IP space. We fix the k value for
the k-NN based recommendation to 50, as it provides the best
results in our experiments.
k-means. Next, we use k-means for clustering and decide to
restrict to stronger correlations, by only taking into account
organizations closer to the cluster’s centroid, and excluding the
rest of them as outliers. We set a distance threshold and choose
the value that yields the best result, i.e., the cluster distance
value below which 40% of the organizations can be found.
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Figure 4: k-NN: (a) TP improvement, (b) FP increase (y-axis in log scale), (c) FN increase, (d) TPR, (e) Precision, (f) F1 measure.
Fig. 3(a)–3(c) plot the average improvement in TP and increase
in FP and FN. TPimpr is almost constant with IP2IP (0.2) in-
dependent of the cluster sizes, while with the other methods it
decreases faster due to the distance thresholds, ranging from
1.1 with global for k = 1 to 0.1 of intersection for k = 35.
IP2IP shows steady FNincr values compared to other meth-
ods (−0.2, i.e., a 20% decrease) which leads to a better per-
formance in TPR, as shown in Fig. 3(d), for k ≥ 10 (up to
0.71). Furthermore, intersection yields the best performance
in FNincr (−0.52), with k = 1. Fig. 3(f) shows the best F1
measure (0.30) is reached with k = 5, due to a peak both in
PPV and TPR. IP2IP performs slightly worse (0.23) than local
(0.28) while poor F1 values for global, with k = 35, (0.18) are
due to its bad PPV (0.10) – see Fig. 3(e).
k-NN. Recall that k indicates the number of nearest neighbors
that each entity considers as its most similar ones. Thus, or-
ganizations can end up in more than one neighborhood. Since
the algorithm builds a neighborhood for each organization, not
all clusters have the same strength, so we only consider strong
clusters in terms of their members similarity and as done with
k-means, after tuning the parameters, we set a distance thresh-
old as the 40th percentile to leave possible outliers out of the
clusters. From Fig. 4(a), we observe that IP2IP+intersection
yields the second best performance in TPimpr (0.38, with
k = 35), while global peaks at 0.60. In terms of FPincr, IP2IP
doubles it (for k = 35), while intersection achieves the lowest
value with 0.51 (again, for k = 35). As with previous cluster-
ing algorithms, we notice that intersection yields the best de-
crease in FN, i.e.,−0.5 with k = 35. Intersection also achieves
the highest TPR (up to 0.77) with larger cluster sizes (i.e., for
k ≥ 10), while its combination with the IP2IP reduces it (0.71)
– see Fig. 4(d). Fig. 4(e) shows that intersection has the best
PPV (0.19 for k = 15), similar to local (0.18), while IP2IP
performs worse (0.16) due to higher FPincr (almost doubling
the FP for k = 35). Finally, from Fig. 4(f), note that intersec-
tion yields the highest F1 (0.30 for k = 15).
Summary of results. We summarize the best results for each
clustering algorithm, in terms of best F1, recall, precision, and
TPimpr in Tables 2–5. We note that intersection is that shar-
ing mechanism that maximizes all metrics, except for TPimpr,
which is instead maximized with IP2IP+intersection. Both k-
means and k-NN peak at 0.30 in F1 including, respectively,
280 and 240 collaborators over all time windows. Agglom-
erative clustering involves all 700 contributors and achieves
F1 = 0.27. k-NN with k = 35 yields the best results for
TPR (0.77), while both k-NN with k = 35 and k-means with
k = 5 achieve 0.19 in PPV. In terms of TPimpr, k-means
reaches a maximum of 0.61 with k = 1 and clusters of size 28
on average, selecting 270 collaborators overall. Slightly lower
improvements are achieved with other clustering algorithms,
but with more collaborators benefiting from sharing, as well as
fewer FP.
Data sharing always helps organizations forecast attacks,
compared to performing predictions locally. Predicting based
on all data from collaborators yields the highest improvement
in TPimpr – especially for bigger clusters – but with a dra-
matic increase in FPincr. When organizations share correlated
attacks (IP2IP), we observe a steady TPimpr, while sharing
common attacks (intersection) outperforms the former when
bigger clusters are formed. However, intersection introduces
lower FPincr, ultimately leading to better precision and F1
measures. IP2IP+intersection always outperforms the two sep-
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Setting Max F1 [Sharing Intersection]
Clustering k Avg Size #Coll. TPR PPV TPimpr FPincr FNincr F1
Agglom. 15 4.6 700 0.72 0.16 0.38± 3.51 0.71± 4.49 -0.42 0.27
k-means 5 5.8 280 0.73 0.19 0.44± 4.21 0.31± 1.47 -0.32 0.30
k-NN 15 6 240 0.74 0.19 0.27± 0.20 0.33± 0.28 -0.37 0.30
Table 2: Best Cases of our Experiments for F1.
Setting Max TPR [Sharing Intersection]
Clustering k Avg Size #Coll. TPR PPV TPimpr FPincr FNincr F1
Agglom. 1 70 700 0.76 0.15 0.50± 3.95 1.12± 6.98 -0.53 0.25
k-means 5 5.8 280 0.73 0.19 0.44± 4.21 0.31± 1.47 -0.32 0.30
k-NN 35 14 320 0.77 0.17 0.32± 0.21 0.51± 0.50 -0.49 0.28
Table 3: Best Cases of our Experiments for TPR.
arate methods in terms of TPimpr, thus, it is the recommended
strategy if one only wants to maximize the number of predicted
attacks.
Impact of cluster size. With agglomerative clustering, each
organization is assigned to exactly one cluster and thus partic-
ipates in/benefits from collaboration. We observe higher TPR
for bigger clusters and, generally, a stable improvement in TP
is achieved on average. Similar results are obtained with k-
means when all organizations are assigned to clusters. How-
ever, when we set a distance threshold, creating more consis-
tent clusters, we observe fluctuations in TPR: as clusters get
smaller much faster (in relation to k value), IP2IP starts outper-
forming intersection. This indicates that correlated attacks can
improve knowledge of organizations and enhance their local
predictions, especially in smaller clusters. With k-NN, a differ-
ent behavior is observed: for smaller clusters, IP2IP achieves
higher TPR (up to 0.7 for k = 5) but, as clusters get bigger,
intersection yields the best results (up to 0.77 for k = 35).
Overall, collaborating in big clusters leads to high TPimpr but
at the same time it introduces significant FPincr.
Increase/Improvement in TP/FP/FN. We observe that, for
all clustering algorithms, maximizing TPimpr always leads to
higher FPincr, from 1.51 of k-NN up to 5.33 of Agglomer-
ative. The settings that maximize the F1 measure, TPR, and
PPV, (when sharing intersection) also minimize FNincr, e.g.
agglomerative with k = 1 achieves −0.53 FNincr. In general,
we observe that (privacy-friendly) collaboration does yield a
remarkable increase in TP but also in FP, which results in a
limited improvement in F1 score compared to predicting using
local logs only.
Overall, our measurements allow us to quantify how dif-
ferent collaboration strategies affect prediction in terms of in-
creasing true positives, false positive, and false negatives, and
in general precision, recall, and F1. Ultimately, the main goal
is to find settings that improve TP while keeping the increase in
FP as low as possible. In this context, the best approach is shar-
ing common and correlated attacks (IP2IP+intersection) with
k-NN (see Table 5).
Hybrid approach vs state of the art [9, 14]. When com-
paring the hybrid approach to Soldo et al. [14], we observe
that [14] achieves higher maximum TPimpr (0.99 vs 0.61 with
k-means, k = 1). However, our privacy-preserving techniques
outperform [14] in terms of recall (TPR) (e.g., with k-NN we
reach 0.77 compared to their 0.66, i.e. up to 18% increase) as
well as precision (0.19 with k-means, k = 5 vs 0.08, i.e. up
to 15% increase) and F1 measure (0.30 with k-NN, k = 15
vs 0.14). Finally, comparing the hybrid approach to [9]the for-
Setting Max PPV [Sharing Intersection]
Clustering k Avg Size #Coll. TPR PPV TPimpr FPincr FNincr F1
Agglom. 25 2.8 700 0.69 0.16 0.33± 3.29 0.47± 2.23 -0.35 0.26
k-means 5 5.8 280 0.73 0.19 0.44± 4.21 0.31± 1.47 -0.32 0.30
k-NN 15 6 240 0.74 0.19 0.27± 0.20 0.33± 0.28 -0.37 0.30
Table 4: Best Cases of our Experiments for PPV.
Setting Max TP Improvement [Sharing IP2IP+intersection ]
Clustering k Avg Size #Coll. TPR PPV TPimpr FPincr FNincr F1
Agglom. 1 70 700 0.67 0.11 0.52± 3.95 5.33± 16.9 -0.08 0.19
k-means 1 28 270 0.64 0.11 0.61± 5.36 3.55± 7.17 -0.17 0.18
k-NN 35 14 320 0.71 0.14 0.38± 0.25 1.51± 1.02 -0.19 0.23
Table 5: Best Cases of our Experiments for TPimpr .
mer yields better results in terms of TPimpr (0.61 for k-means,
k = 1 vs 0.13 for top 3% of global pairs) and TPR (0.77 for
k-NN, k = 35 vs 0.66 for top 1% of global pairs), but similar
F1 score (0.30 vs 0.28), due to the latter’s smaller increase in
FP.
Overall, we conclude that a controlled data sharing ap-
proach, compared to a centralized one, helps organizations
find a better trade-off between prediction improvement and in-
crease in false positives, while minimizing exposure of possi-
bly confidential data.
5 Implementing At Scale
As discussed above, our hybrid system involves four steps:
(1) secure computation of pairwise similarity, (2) clustering,
(3) secure data sharing within the clusters, and (4) time-series
prediction. To assess its scalability, we need to evaluate com-
putation and communication complexities incurred by each
step. Naturally, steps (1) and (3) dominate complexities as they
require running a number of cryptographic operations (involv-
ing public-key crypto) that depends on the number of organiza-
tions involved. In fact, clustering incurs a negligible overhead:
on commodity hardware, to perform clustering with 1,000 or-
ganizations, it takes 6.1ms for k-means, 81ms for agglomer-
ative and 5.2ms for k-NN (k = 2).Also, time-series EWMA
prediction requires 4.6µs per IP, so it takes 4.6ms for 1,000
IPs. As we compute pairwise similarity based on the amount
of common attacks between two organizations, and support its
secure computation via PSI-CA [6], step (1) requires a num-
ber of protocol runs quadratic in the number of organizations.
In our experiments, it takes 1.98s and 2.12MB bandwidth for
one protocol execution, using 2048-bit moduli, with sets of
size 4,000 (the average number of attacks observed by each
organization). As for (3), i.e., secure within-cluster sharing of
events related to common attacks (intersection), we rely on
PSI-DT [7], and it takes 1.24s and 2.18MB for a single ex-
ecution with the same settings. Therefore, complexities may
become prohibitive when more organizations are involved or
more alerts are used.
Aiming to improve scalability, we also implement a variant
supporting secure computation of pairwise similarity as well
as secure log sharing without a quadratic number of public-
key operations/quadratic communication overhead. Recall that
we rely on a semi-trusted authority, STA, for clustering and co-
ordination, which is assumed to follow protocol specifications
and not to collude with other organizations, thus, we can actu-
ally use it to also help with secure computations. Inspired by
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Algorithm 1 ENCRYPTION [All Organizations]
for each Oi ∈ O do
Si ← ∅, Ei ← ∅, Ki ← ∅
for each (dj , timej) ∈ Di do
for cnt := 1 to COUNT (dj) do
Si ← Si ∪ PRPk(dj ||cnt)
kj ← H(dj ||cnt)
Ei ← Ei ∪ Enckj (dj , timej)
Ki ← Ki ∪ kj
Send Si, Ei to STA and store Ki
Algorithm 2 O2O COMPUTATION [STA]
for each Oi ∈ O do
for each Oj 6= Oi do
O2O[i, j]← |Si ∩ Sj |
Buff[i, j]← {(`, Ej`), ∀` ∈ INDEX(Si ∩ Sj)}
Perform Clustering on O2O[·, ·]
Send relevant Buff[·, ·] entries to organizations in the same cluster
Algorithm 3 LOG SHARING [Organizations in C∗]
for each Oi ∈ C∗ do
S′i ← ∅
for each Oj 6= Oi ∈ C∗ do
for each (`, Ej`) ∈ Buff[i, j] do
S′i = S
′
i ∪ Deck`(E`)
Kamara et al.’s server-aided PSI [10], we extend our frame-
work by replacing public-key cryptography operations with
pseudo-random permutations (PRP), which we instantiate us-
ing AES. Specifically, we minimize interactions among pairs
of organizations so that the complexity incurred by each of
them is constant, while only imposing a minimal, linear com-
munication overhead on STA.
Our extension involves four phases: (i) setup where, as
in [10], one organization generates a random key κ and sends
it to the other organizations, (ii) encryption (see Algorithm 1),
where each organization Oi evaluates the PRP on each entry
dj in their sets and encrypts the associated timestamp timej ,
(iii) O2O computation (see Algorithm 2), where STA com-
putes the magnitude of common attacks between each pair of
organizations in order to perform clustering, and (iv) log shar-
ing (see Algorithm 3), where organizations in the same clus-
ter C∗ receive information about common attacks (S′i-s). Note
that building the O2O matrix is actually optimized using hash
tables (i.e., dense hash set and dense hash map from Spare-
hash. Also, since sets in our system are multi-sets, we con-
catenate counters to the IP address, so that the STA cannot tell
which and how many IPs appear more than once.
Experimental Evaluation. We benchmark the performance
of PSI-CA [7] and PSI-DT [7] using 2048-bit moduli, mod-
ifying the OpenSSL/GMP-based C implementation in [8], as
well as the PRP-based scheme presented above and inspired
by Kamara et al.’s work [10]. Experiments are run using two
2.3GHz Intel Core i5 CPUs with 8GB of RAM connected via
a 100Mbps Ethernet link. Figures 5(a) and 5(b) plot compu-
tation and communication complexities incurred by an indi-
vidual organization vis-a`-vis the total number of organizations
involved in the system, while Fig. 5(c) reports the communica-
tion overhead introduced on the STA-side for the PRP scheme.
As expected, complexities for PSI-CA/PSI-DT protocols on
each organization grow linearly in the number of organizations
(hence, quadratic overall). For instance, if 1,000 organizations
are involved, it would take about 16 minutes per organization,
each transmitting 1GB. Whereas, the PRP-based scheme in-
curs constant complexities on each organization (57.6ms and
120KB) and a low communication overhead on the STA (about
100MB) for 1,000 organizations (Fig. 5(c)).
We also evaluate the IP2IP method whereby organizations
interact with STA in order to discover cluster-wide correlated
attacks. Assuming clusters of 100 organizations and an IP2IP
matrix of (224 · 224)/2 (recall we consider the whole /24 IP
space), we measure a 2.7s running time per organization with
41KB of bandwidth as well as a 0.07s overhead on the STA
with 4.1MB bandwidth. Using the private Count-Min sketch
based implementation by Melis et al. [12], we can compress
to a logarithmic factor with a small, bounded loss, and the pri-
vate aggregation is done over 10,336 elements. Even if clusters
are bigger than 100, as detailed in [12], one can still perform
private aggregation on multiple subgroups (e.g., of size 100)
without endangering organizations’ privacy.
Security. Protocols do not leak any information about the logs
of each organization to the STA, with or without using the
server-aided variant. Clustering is performed over similarity
measures computed obliviously to STA, and so does within-
cluster data sharing. Privacy-preserving computation occurs by
using existing secure protocols such as PSI-CA/PSI-DT by De
Cristofaro et al. [7, 6]), server-aided PSI by Kamara et al. [10],
as well as private recommendation via succinct sketches by
Melis et al. [12]. Therefore, we do not provide any additional
proofs in the paper as the security of our techniques straight-
forwardly relies on that of these protocols.
6 Conclusion
This paper presented the result of a measurement study
of collaborative predictive blacklisting (CPB). We evaluated
a number of metrics on a real-world dataset obtained from
DShield.org, aiming to shed light on the effects of collabo-
ration when considering two state-of-the-art approaches, one,
non privacy-preserving, relying on trusted central party [14]
and another peer-to-peer using privacy-preserving data shar-
ing [9]. We also introduced a third, hybrid approach that aims
to combine the best of the two worlds.
Naturally, having access to more logs does not necessarily
result in better predictions. In fact, our experiments showed
that the techniques proposed by Soldo et al. [14] achieve im-
pressive hit counts (almost doubling the number of correct pre-
dictions compared to local predictions) but suffer from poor
precision due to high FP. On the other hand, the privacy-
friendly decentralized system proposed by Freudiger et al. [9]
achieves better F1 scores overall, although with a decreased
improvement in TP. Finally, our analysis shows that our hybrid
approach outperforms both approaches, balancing out true and
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Figure 5: Computation (a) and communication (b) overhead at each organization for PSI-CA, PSI-DT, and PRP-based scheme, and communi-
cation overhead at the STA in PRP scheme (c).
false positives, while maintaining privacy protection.
As part of future work, we plan to conduct a longitudi-
nal measurement to fully grasp the effectiveness of privacy-
enhanced CPB in the wild, apply our methods to other datasets,
and experiment with more advanced machine learning tech-
niques to improve overall performances.
References
[1] Symantec DeepSight. https://symc.ly/2rXxB1w.
[2] U.S. Anti-Bot Code of Conduct for Internet ser-
vice providers: Barriers and Metrics Considerations.
https://transition.fcc.gov/bureaus/pshs/advisory/csric3/
CSRIC III WG7 Report March %202013.pdf, 2013.
[3] Facebook ThreatExchange. https://threatexchange.fb.
com, 2015.
[4] CERT UK. Cyber-security Information Sharing Partner-
ship (CiSP). https://www.cert.gov.uk/cisp/, 2015.
[5] D. Chakrabarti, S. Papadimitriou, D. S. Modha, and
C. Faloutsos. Fully automatic cross-associations. In ACM
KDD, 2004.
[6] E. De Cristofaro, P. Gasti, and G. Tsudik. Fast and Pri-
vate Computation of Cardinality of Set Intersection and
Union. In CANS, 2012.
[7] E. De Cristofaro and G. Tsudik. Practical private set in-
tersection protocols with linear complexity. In Financial
Cryptography and Data Security, 2010.
[8] E. De Cristofaro and G. Tsudik. Experimenting with fast
private set intersection. In TRUST, 2012.
[9] J. Freudiger, E. De Cristofaro, and A. Brito. Controlled
Data Sharing for Collaborative Predictive Blacklisting. In
DIMVA, 2015.
[10] S. Kamara, P. Mohassel, M. Raykova, and S. Sadeghian.
Scaling private set intersection to billion-element sets. In
FC, 2014.
[11] S. Katti, B. Krishnamurthy, and D. Katabi. Collaborating
against common enemies. In ACM IMC, 2005.
[12] L. Melis, G. Danezis, and E. De Cristofaro. Efficient Pri-
vate Statistics with Succinct Sketches. In NDSS, 2016.
[13] Red Sky Alliance. http://redskyalliance.org/.
[14] F. Soldo, A. Le, and A. Markopoulou. Predictive black-
listing as an implicit recommendation system. In INFO-
COM, 2010.
[15] The White House. Executive order promoting private
sector cybersecurity information sharing. http://1.usa.
gov/1vISfBO, 2015.
[16] J. Zhang, P. A. Porras, and J. Ullrich. Highly predictive
blacklisting. In USENIX, 2008.
A Reproducing Our Experiments
We provide detailed information for researchers wishing
to reproduce the experimental results presented in this paper.
Please install Python 2.7 as well as the following Python pack-
ages: numpy 1.14.0, scipy 1.0.0, scikit-learn 0.19.1, pandas
0.22.0 and matplotlib 2.0.0. All of the above packages can be
installed via “pip”.
Code. Source code is available at the following git repository:
https://github.com/mex2meou/collsec.git
Dataset. To obtain the DShield dataset that was used in our
experiments, use the following download link and extract its
contents (i.e., the .pkl files) in the ‘data’ folder of the cloned
repository.
1 wget https :// www.dropbox.com/s/
kmiejttl4ceufpp/data.zip
2 cp data.zip collsec/data
3 cd collsec/data
4 unzip data.zip
Soldo et al [14]. To replicate the experiments for Soldo et
al [14]’s implicit recommendation system, we also need the
MATLAB implementation of Chakrabarti et al. [5] for the
Cross Associations (CA) co-clustering algorithm. To this end,
one should install Octave 4.0.0 as well as the Python package
oct2py 3.5.0 (which can also be installed via “pip”). First, to
compile the Cross Associations algorithm follow the steps:
1 cd collsec/soldo/ CA python
2 octave
3 mex cc col nz .c
4 quit
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Then, to link our Python implementation with the Octave
workspace of CA configure accordingly the path in the file
‘collsec/soldo/CA python/ca utils.py’ (line 6). Finally, to run
the experiments of Section 3.1:
1 cd collsec/soldo
2 python soldo.py
Note. To configure the parameter k of the k-NN algorithm
included in the ensemble method of [14] modify the file
‘collsec/soldo/top neighbors.py’ (line 4). Moreover, if exper-
iments for various values of k are executed, modify the file
‘collsec/soldo/soldo.py’ (line 41) to prevent the CA algorithm
from running again.
Controlled Data Sharing. To repeat the experiments for the
Controlled Data Sharing system by Freudiger et al. [9], i.e.,
Section 3.2:
1 %
2 cd collsec/dimva−global
3 python dimva−global.py
4
5 %
6 cd collsec/dimva−local
7 python dimva−local.py
Note. To configure the length of the training and testing win-
dows for the system of Freudiger et al. [9], modify the file
‘collsec/utils/dimva util.py’.
Hybrid Approach. To launch the experiments for our pro-
posed hybrid scheme (see Section 4) please execute the fol-
lowing steps:
1 %
2 %
3 cd collsec/agglomerative
4 python agglomerative.py
5
6 %
7 %
8 cd collsec/kmeans
9 python kmeans.py
10
11 %
12 %
13 cd collsec/knn
14 python knn.py
Note. Our implementation by default is configured to utilize a
5-day training window and a 1-day testing one as done in previ-
ous work [9, 14]. If one wants to change this setting, please ad-
just the parameters indicated in the files ‘collsec/utils/util.py’
and ‘collsec/utils/time series.py’.
Results. The results of all the above scripts are stored in the
folder titled ‘collsec/results’. To visualize the results and ob-
tain the figures presented in the paper, type the following com-
mands:
1 cd collsec/results
2
3 %
4 python soldo plots .py
5
6 %
7 python dimva global plots .py
8
9 %
10 python dimva local plots .py
11
12 %
13 python hybrid plots .py
10
